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ABSTRACT Using a sample of Spanish listed firms for the period 1997 2002 we find that
firms where the CEO has a low influence over the functioning of the board of directors show
a greater degree of accounting conservatism. We measure the influence of the CEO over the
board of directors using two aggregate indexes combining six (eight) characteristics of the
functioning of the board of directors and its monitoring committees: board size, proportion
of non executive directors, proportion of independent directors, whether the chairman of
the board is an executive director, the number of board meetings, and the existence of
an audit committee, a nomination/remuneration committee and an executive committee.
We define conservatism as the asymmetric recognition speed of good and bad news in
earnings, and we measure it following Basu (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24,
pp. 3 37, 1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39,
pp. 83 128, 2005). Our results are robust to alternative specifications and specific
controls for investment opportunities and for the endogenous nature of corporate
governance and earnings quality. Overall, our evidence shows that firms with strong
boards use conservative accounting numbers as a governance tool, even in an
institutional setting with low litigation risk such as Spain.
1. Introduction
Basu (1997) defines accounting conservatism as the asymmetric recognition
speed of good and bad news in earnings. Conservatism is commonly defined
by accounting frameworks as a prudent reaction to uncertainty destined to
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protect the rights and claims of debt-holders and shareholders that imposes a
higher standard of verification to recognize good news than bad news in earnings,
generating earnings that reflect bad news in a timelier fashion. Basu predicts and
finds that earnings and prices tend to reflect bad news simultaneously, whilst
prices reflect good news faster than accounting earnings. This prediction is at
the root of Basu’s conservatism measure: the asymmetric timeliness of earnings;
commonly denoted conditional conservatism, earnings conservatism or ex post
conservatism.1 Recent literature identifies another type of conservatism: uncon-
ditional, balance-sheet or ex ante conservatism, which is news independent and
generates a persistent understatement of shareholders equity (Feltham and
Ohlson, 1995; Beaver and Ryan, 2005).
Conservatism has been a salient characteristic of accounting information for
centuries, and recent research into this area has documented a significant increase
in conservatism in the last few decades (Givoly and Hayn, 2000). Several expla-
nations are presented to justify the existence of conservatism, and all of them
coincide in highlighting that conservatism benefits the users of financial infor-
mation. These explanations may be grouped into four categories: (1) contracting
motivations; (2) litigation risk; (3) tax optimization; and (4) asymmetries in the
loss functions of regulators. The existing empirical evidence provides support for
the contractual and litigation explanations, although taxation and regulation also
contribute to the existence of conservatism (Watts, 2003b).
Watts (2003a) explains that, from the point of view of contracting and litiga-
tion risk, conservatism originates from the existence of (1) information asymme-
tries; (2) asymmetries in compensation contracts; (3) limited liability; and (4) the
fact that the parties to the firm have different time-horizons. Conservative
accounting numbers can be used in contracts among the different parties to the
firm to reduce moral hazard problems created by the aforementioned asymme-
tries. Contracts based on conservative (prudent) numbers reduce the probability
of managerial expropriation of shareholders’ resources or of excessive distri-
bution of resources to the shareholders at the expense of debt-holders. The asym-
metric verification requirements of good and bad news that conservatism imposes
contributes to limit managerial opportunism, thereby increasing firm value,
which benefits all the economic agents.
Corporate governance mechanisms likely play a significant role in the
implementation of accounting conservatism. Corporate governance encompasses
all the provisions and mechanisms that guarantee that the assets of the firm are
managed efficiently and in the interests of the providers of finance, mitigating
the inappropriate expropriation of resources by managers or any other party to
the firm. At the centre of this decision-making and control system is the board
of directors, which plays a fundamental role in the government of large compa-
nies. The implementation of mechanisms that facilitate and improve the monitor-
ing and control exerted by the board over senior managers is expected to result in
increased managerial evaluation and control, reductions in litigation risk,
enhanced auditor independence and, particularly, in a demand for timelier
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accounting information. The acceleration in the recognition of bad news provides
the board of directors with early warning signals to investigate the origin of bad
news. These positive outcomes that derived from the strengthening of the func-
tioning of the board of directors coincide with those associated to accounting con-
servatism, giving rise to the main prediction of this study.
We predict that firms with stronger corporate governance mechanisms in place
(stronger boards) will present more conditionally conservative accounting
numbers, as defined by Basu (1997) and by Ball and Shivakumar (2005). We
focus on conditional conservatism as it plays a clear role in the contracting and
monitoring functions of corporate governance. However, it is difficult to see
how contracting is affected by conservatism in the form of an unconditional
accounting bias of known magnitude. Rational agents would simply invert the
bias. Moreover, if the bias is unknown, it can only reduce contracting efficiency
(Ball and Shivakumar, 2005).
Thus, it is expected that the sensitivity of earnings to bad news will be greater
in firms where the board of directors has greater control over the chief executive
officer (CEO) than in firms with weaker boards. Governance is a complex con-
struct with multiple dimensions. Our study focuses on one of these dimensions:
the board of directors and its delegate committees. Therefore, when we employ
the expression corporate governance, we do it in this restrictive sense. To
measure board of directors’ quality we develop two aggregate indexes that
take into account several characteristics of the functioning of the board and its
committees.
To test our prediction, we use a sample of 69 Spanish quoted companies for the
period 1997 2002. The results indicate that firms where the CEO has low influ-
ence over the functioning of the board of directors show a greater degree of
accounting conservatism than firms where the CEO has a high influence over
the board. Thus, the earnings of strong corporate governance firms reflect bad
news in a timelier (faster) fashion than the earnings of firms where the CEO
has a large influence over the board. In addition, the results show that good
news is incorporated into earnings with a greater lag in firms with stronger
boards.
The first study on the links between corporate governance and accounting con-
servatism is the UK-based work of Beekes et al. (2004), who show that firms with
a higher percentage of non-executive directors tend to recognize bad news in a
timelier fashion as measured by Basu’s method. These results are confirmed by
Ahmed and Duellman (2007) who, using three different measures of conserva-
tism, document for a US sample that (i) the percentage of inside directors is
negatively related to conservatism, and (ii) the percentage of outside directors’
shareholdings is positively related to conservatism. In line with this evidence,
Garcı´a Lara et al. (2009) also find a positive association between accounting
conservatism and corporate governance for US firms, and Lobo and Zhou
(2006) present evidence of an increase in conservatism as a result of the pro-
visions of the Sarbanes Oxley Act to strengthen corporate governance.
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Our study differs from those of Beekes et al. (2004) and Ahmed and
Duellman (2007) along several dimensions. First, we incorporate a more
extensive measure of governance, building an aggregate index that takes
into account not only directors’ denominations, but seven additional character-
istics of the functioning of the board of directors: board size, proportion of
non-executive directors, proportion of independent directors, whether the
chairman of the board is an executive director, the number of board meetings,
and the existence of an audit committee, a nomination/remuneration committee
and an executive committee.2 By using this aggregate index, we can account
for the existence of interactions between the different mechanisms, and the
fact that the performance of each of these mechanisms may affect the effec-
tiveness of the rest. The use of an aggregate index is particularly justified in
the case of Spain, since recent literature shows that independent boards are
inefficient in securing earnings quality unless independent directors are sup-
ported by other governance mechanisms, such as an independent nomination
and remuneration committee (Garcı´a Osma and Gill de Albornoz, 2007).
Second, our analysis takes into account firm growth opportunities when
studying the differences in the asymmetric recognition of good and bad
news across governance structures. This is a necessary control, because
otherwise any observed differences between governance structures could be
driven by changes in growth opportunities (and the effects of the understate-
ment of assets) instead of by changes in conservatism (Roychowdhury and
Watts, 2007). Third, we acknowledge the endogenous nature of governance
choice and control for a set of firm characteristics that may affect this
choice. Fourth, we use an alternative measure to the Basu (1997) conservatism
model: the Ball and Shivakumar (2005) measure, which is entirely accounting-
based. The reason for using an alternative measure of conditional conservatism
is the recent evidence in Dietrich et al. (2007), who show that the Basu
approach may produce biased results and recommend the use of alternative
methods to validate the results. Finally, we analyse a sample of Spanish
firms; to the best of our knowledge, this is the first piece of empirical evidence
that investigates the role of conservatism in governance in a civil-law setting,
such as Spain. Prior research highlights the differences in the role played
by conservative accounting between common-law and civil-law accounting
regimes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
association between corporate governance and accounting conservatism, and
the role of governance and conservative accounting numbers in a civil-law
setting such as Spain. Section 3 details the research method, describing the
governance and conservatism measures used in our empirical tests. The sample
selection procedure is described in Section 4, which also contains variable
descriptive statistics. The results, including the impact of board of directors’
characteristics on conservatism measures are presented in Section 5, where the
main sensitivity checks are also explained. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
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2. Corporate Governance and Conditional Conservatism
The design of firm governance, through the creation of mechanisms, instruments
and provisions that strengthen and support the monitoring role of the board of
directors, is aimed at guaranteeing that investors obtain a return for their invest-
ment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Managerial monitoring is exerted both via
natural mechanisms, such as capital market pressures, firm ownership structure
or leverage; and institutional mechanisms, such as auditors, boards of directors
and monitoring committees.3 In this section, we first describe the central role
played by corporate boards within this governance control system, paying par-
ticular attention to current Spanish governance practices and guidance, and
then, we present our predictions on the association between stronger boards of
directors and conditional conservatism.
2.1. Corporate Governance Structure: The Monitoring Role of the Board of
Directors
Previous research provides mounting evidence that the functioning and charac-
teristics of the board of directors is associated not only to firm performance,
but also to the distribution of power within the firm, and how this distribution
affects the distribution of rents. For instance, the evidence in Core et al. (1999)
shows that board characteristics associated to weak corporate governance for
example, when the CEO is also the chairman of the board, when board
members are nominated by the CEO, or there is a high presence of very old or
busy directors are correlated with higher CEO remuneration, after controlling
for other economic factors that could justify higher CEO compensation. Core
et al. (1999) find that their prediction of excess CEO compensation, based on
firm governance structure, has a negative correlation with future returns in one,
three and five year time-horizons.
There are several arguments that provide a theoretical foundation for these
results. The main one is based on agency theory: deficient governance structures
generate an increase in agency costs. Agency costs appear because of the lack of
alignment between the interests and incentives of the different agents and parties
to the firm, as each agent attempts to maximize his own utility instead of firm
value. These agency costs translate, among other things, into lower operational
performance, higher rents for managers, excess resource distribution to share-
holders at the expense of debt-holders, and are consistent with the existence of
inefficient contracts among the parties. The board of directors plays a central
role in monitoring and controlling the behaviour of senior managers, protecting
the interests of the different parties to the firm and ameliorating these agency con-
flicts and improving contracting efficiency (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983).
2.1.1. Corporate boards in Spain
Awareness of the importance of firm governance has existed for many decades;
however, corporate governance regulation is a relatively recent development in
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Spain. The first Spanish governance code is the Olivencia Report (1998), which
focuses on the role of the board of directors in constraining aggressive accounting
practices that reduce the transparency and reliability of financial statements. The
Olivencia Report, of voluntary adoption, consists of 23 good governance
recommendations, out of which, 19 directly relate to the composition, size, func-
tioning and characteristics of the board of directors and its monitoring commit-
tees. This highlights the central role assigned to the board, and particularly, to
independent directors. Inside directors are expected to align themselves closely
with the CEO. Hence, it is independent directors that shoulder the task of moni-
toring management. As described in the Olivencia Report, there are three types of
directors in Spanish boards: (i) inside directors that hold managerial positions;
(ii) institutional directors that represent the interests of large shareholders and
institutional investors; and (iii) outside directors, who are experts that hold no
stock in the company. The Report considers both outside and institutional direc-
tors as independent, and assigns them the role of monitoring and evaluating man-
agement, with the ultimate goal of improving the quality of financial statements.
Thus, these governance recommendations align themselves closely to early
governance codes such as the UK’s Cadbury Report (1992). However, Spain is
a civil-law regime. Corporate governance demands and the underlying insti-
tutional setting significantly differ between common and civil-law regimes. In
particular, the quality of enforcement, the level of investor protection, firm own-
ership structures and litigation risk for auditors and directors are expected to be
dissimilar (see, e.g. LaPorta et al., 1998, 1999), creating different governance
needs and incentives, which raise concerns that these governance measures
may not be equality efficient in civil-law settings.
As pointed out by Beekes et al. (2004), for boards of directors to be efficient
monitors two conditions must be met: (i) independent directors must possess suf-
ficient incentives to monitor; and (ii) they must understand the financial reporting
system. While it is reasonable to assume that directors have a grasp on the finan-
cial reporting process, due to the lack of an economic, social and legal tradition of
Spanish directors (Recalde, 2003), there may be doubts that the first condition is
met, particularly in the case of outside directors as institutional directors
assume the monitoring role of institutional investors identified by Shleifer and
Vishny (1986). Additionally, in civil-law regimes the demand for conditional
conservative measures is lower than in common-law countries given the low liti-
gation risk and high unconditional conservatism (Ball et al., 2000; Giner and
Rees, 2001; Garcı´a Lara and Mora, 2004; Garcı´a Lara et al., 2005; Bushman
and Piotroski, 2006; Gassen et al., 2006).
In recent years, there have been several changes to Spanish governance regu-
latory framework that cast additional doubts over the efficiency of the initial rec-
ommendations. The Aldama Report (2003) denounced a poor implementation of
the Olivencia governance recommendations and a new law was passed in Spain
in 2002 (law 44/2002), whereby, for example, quoted companies are now
obliged to have an audit committee composed of a majority of independent
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directors. From 2008 onwards, a new good governance code will be
implemented: the Conthe Report (2006) that combines the recommendations of
the Olivencia and the Aldama reports, and has met significant opposition from
Spanish quoted companies, due to its more restricted definition of who may
serve as an independent director.
Thus, the positive association between governance and conservatism found by
previous research in this area need not hold in a civil-law setting such as Spain.
2.2. The Links between Governance Monitoring and Accounting
Conservatism
Accounting conservatism provides significant benefits for the users of financial
information. The use of conservative accounting numbers in contracts among
the different parties to the firm reduces information asymmetries and moral
hazard problems derived from agency conflicts (Watts, 2003b). Contracts
written using prudent numbers reduce the probability of managerial expropria-
tion of firm resources or excess distribution of these resources. Therefore, it is
expected that timely incorporation of economic losses (bad news) into earnings
will reduce the opportunities for managerial opportunistic behaviour, facilitating
managerial monitoring, as well as the monitoring of firm contracts, such as debt
contracts. Due to these beneficial effects, accounting conservatism is commonly
considered as an indicator of earnings quality or a desirable property of account-
ing earnings (Watts, 2003b; Francis et al., 2004; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005).
Nevertheless, some researchers have argued that the firm stakeholders are as
interested in timely information on gains as on timely information on losses,
and so question the merits of the one-sided approach of conservatism. The impli-
cation is that, for instance, lenders not only care about losses but also about poten-
tially offsetting gains. However, this view fails to consider that lenders’ payoffs
are asymmetric as they do not receive returns above the face value of the debt.
When the value of the firm is well above the value of debt, lenders are hardly
interested in gains. On the contrary, lenders fully participate in losses when the
value of the firm falls below the value of the debt. Then, lenders are particularly
interested in timely information about losses so that they can exercise legal
actions to remove incumbent management and take control of the firm. Hence,
their demand for timely information on gains is expected to be small relative
to the demand for timely information on losses. Similarly, shareholders are
expected to demand conditionally conservative accounting numbers. Conserva-
tive accounting aligns the interests of managers and shareholders, reducing the
tendency of managers with short-term horizons to invest in negative-NPV (net
present value) projects, because managers are aware that they will not be able
to defer the recognition of losses to the future. In addition, conservative account-
ing imposes greater costs to biasing financial reports upwards (Guay and Verrec-
chia, 2006), and can thus be used as a mechanism to motivate managers to cut
losses earlier and abandon poorly performing projects. Watts (2003a) also
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points out that conservatism prevents overcompensation of managers. All of
these favourable outcomes of conservatism contribute to increase firm value
and create barriers to the expropriation of shareholders by managers.
Corporate governance mechanisms in general and boards of directors in par-
ticular, are created to monitor managers. The demand for these mechanisms
appears because of the existence of agency conflicts among the different
parties to the firm, and particularly, because of the asymmetries in the incentives
and objectives of managers and providers of finance derived from the separation
of ownership and control (e.g. Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling,
1976). When the design of these mechanisms and provisions permits efficient
monitoring by the board of directors, it is expected that good governance will
result, among other effects, in (i) higher financial statement transparency; (ii)
lower accounting manipulation particularly lower income-increasing earnings
management and therefore, in (iii) a limitation of the ability of managers to
conceal bad news for a long period of time; (iv) greater independence of the
committees destined to monitor management, such as the audit, the remuneration
or the nomination committee; and finally (v) greater support from internal
governance mechanisms to the expected auditor conservative bias.
Thus, stronger corporate governance is expected to result in a higher demand
for timely information and to prevent managers from hiding less favourable
information. Timely information on losses acts as a warning signal to the
board of directors, who can investigate the origin of bad news as soon as it is
known, lowering the agency costs derived from the monitoring of contracts.
We predict that board of directors’ structure and characteristics significantly
determine firm conditional conservatism, both via the increased demand for con-
servative accounting numbers and by mitigating aggressive accounting practices.
Specifically, we expect that firms with strong governance mechanisms in place
will be more conservative, as defined by Basu (1997) and by Ball and
Shivakumar (2005).
3. Research Method
3.1. Corporate Governance Measures: Board of Directors’ Characteristics
To measure the level or quality of firms’ governance, we develop an aggregate
index following the method of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001). We calculate
two aggregate indexes (IndGov6 and IndGov8) that incorporate several character-
istics of the functioning and structure of the board of directors. IndGov6 com-
bines the following proxies:
(1) The proportion of non-executive directors on the board. Clearly, a higher pro-
portion of executive directors on the board is associated to a lower influence
of independent members of the board and therefore, to a higher CEO
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influence over corporate governance. Non-executive directors include
independent directors and directors representing institutional investors.
(2) The proportion of independent directors on the board. Previous research on
the area shows that independent directors positively influence board
decisions. Weisbach (1988) shows that the presence of outside directors is
directly associated to CEO changes perhaps because these firms’ boards
are more independent of management. Byrd and Hickman (1992) show
that bidding firms with a majority of outsiders in their boards obtain higher
abnormal returns than other bidders.
(3) The fact that the chairman of the board is also an executive director can be
interpreted as a higher implication of the CEO in firm governance and
thus, as a sign of weak governance. We assign a value of 1 to this variable
if the chairman is not an executive director (a sign of good governance); 0
otherwise.
(4) Number of board meetings. Vafeas (1999) and Adams (2000) suggest that the
number of board meetings acts as a proxy of the level of real monitoring and
control exerted by directors. Higher values of this variable are therefore
indicative of more effective boards.
(5) Existence of an audit committee. The existence of an audit committee is
associated to increases in the control and monitoring exerted by directors,
and with an increase in the quality and transparency of financial statements
(Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003).4
(6) Existence of a nomination/remuneration committee: the Olivencia Report
recommends the existence of at least two separate board committees: an
audit committee and a nomination/remuneration committee. These commit-
tees guarantee the efficiency of independent board members and act as CEO
monitors. As demonstrated by Dechow et al. (1994), remuneration commit-
tees adjust CEO compensation to prevent opportunistic behaviour, and par-
ticularly, for the case of Spain, Garcı´a Osma and Gill de Albornoz (2007)
provide evidence of the importance of having a nomination/remuneration
committee to guarantee earnings quality.
Our second measure of governance, IndGov8, incorporates all the six variables
that form IndGov6, plus two additional variables that have a more controversial
link with firm corporate governance:
(7) Lack of an executive committee. Although the existence of an executive
committee may appear to improve corporate governance, the Olivencia
Report considers that the existence of an executive committee impairs
good governance, because this committee naturally assumes a significant
role in decision making, lowering the importance of having independent
directors or independent committees. Therefore, this variable takes the
value of 1 if the firm does not have an executive committee (a sign of
good governance); 0 otherwise.
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(8) Board size: Yermack (1996), Conyon and Peck (1998) and Eisenberg et al.
(1998) suggest that the over dimension of boards has a negative impact on
firm value. Several studies have tried to approximate the optimal board
size. Jensen (1993) suggests that the optimal board size is between seven
and eight members. The Olivencia Report purports an optimal size of
between 5 and 15 directors. In our sample, no firm has less than five directors.
Therefore, following the recommendations of the Olivencia Report, board
size takes the value of 1 (good governance) if there are less than 16 directors
on the board; 0 otherwise.
Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), we define our aggregate govern-
ance measures (IndGov6 and IndGov8) as the mean of the six (eight) standar-
dized variables.5 By standardizing the variables the tests should not be
affected by scale problems associated to differences in the measurement of
the variables that make up the indexes.6 It is expected that lower values of
IndGov6 and IndGov8 will be associated to structures where the CEO has a
high influence over the board of directors. For brevity, we refer to these struc-
tures as weak governance. Governance structures with low CEO implication in
board decision making are denoted strong governance. This is the meaning we
attach to the classification of strong vs. weak governance throughout the
paper.
Recent literature provides evidence that the use of indexes that aggregate
several governance measures allows classifying firms in accordance to the
strength of their governance more successfully (see, e.g. Gompers et al., 2003;
Davila and Penalva, 2006). This is because firm governance consists of numerous
mechanisms, instruments and provisions that guarantee good governance when
acting together. These various mechanisms complement each other, and there-
fore, any attempt to evaluate the quality of firm corporate governance should con-
sider a broad set of variables to discriminate between strong and weak
governance structures. Additionally, as demonstrated by recent research,
Spanish outside directors appear to have had low efficiency during the first
phase of the implementation of good governance recommendations. In particular,
it has been documented that the mere presence of outside directors on Spanish
boards has been insufficient to guarantee higher financial statement quality.
The study by Garcı´a Osma and Gill de Albornoz (2007) for instance, shows
that the existence of independent remuneration committees significantly
increases the efficiency of independent directors in limiting earnings manage-
ment practices.
3.1.1. Controlling for the endogenous nature of governance
The appropriate level of governance is a function of firms’ characteristics, as
different types of firms require different levels of governance. Therefore, not
taking into account the economic determinants of governance may lead to
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incorrect inferences. Accordingly, we adopt the view that observed governance
structures capture optimal contracting arrangements, determined endogenously
by firms’ characteristics and contracting environment. To account for these
factors, we develop a model of hypothesized economic determinants of govern-
ance using the findings of previous research. We predict that governance will be
determined by the following variables:
(a) Size. Larger firms are more complex to run and place higher demands on
governance structures (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). We measure size as the
natural logarithm of the market value of equity, measured at the end of the
fiscal year, and predict a positive association between Size and our govern-
ance proxies, IndGov#.
(b) Growth opportunities. Growing firms need more flexible governance
structures, and more room for individual decisions by the entrepreneur.
Consequently, we expect a negative relation between governance and
growth. Following Smith and Watts (1992), our proxy for growth is the
market-to-book value of equity ratio, measured at the end of the fiscal
year (MTB).
(c) Profitability. Previous research documents an association between certain
governance attributes and past firm performance. Hermalin and Weisbach
(1998) find that the likelihood of independent directors being added to the
board increases following poor firm performance. We measure Profitability
as the ratio of net income to shareholders’ equity.
(d) Leverage. In a civil-law context such as Spain, financial institutions play a
key role in providing capital funds, and are represented in the board of
directors as institutional directors. We expect that as leverage increases,
monitoring by financial institutions will also increase leading to improved
governance provisions. Consequently, we expect a positive association
between leverage and IndGov#. We measure Leverage as the debt to
assets ratio. The relation between Leverage and governance has been
previously studied by Cremers and Nair (2005), among others.
(e) Changes in ownership. There is extensive research on the association
between ownership structure and governance (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985;
Bushman et al., 2004) and on how events such as mergers and acquisitions,
IPOs, SEOs and other important changes in the ownership structure may
affect governance and accounting quality (Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al.,
1998a, 1998b). Following Chung et al. (2003) and Cahan and Zhang
(2006), we assume that if there is an annual change greater than 10% in
the number of shares outstanding, an event such as a takeover or a merger
has taken place. Thus, we define an indicator variable (Changes Ownership)
that equals 1 if there is an annual change in the number of shares outstanding
greater than 10%, and 0 otherwise.
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To take into account the endogenous nature of governance choice, we estimate
the following cross-sectional model of the economic determinants of governance:
IndGov#it ¼ b0 þ b1 Sizeit þ b2 MTBit þ b3 Profitabilityit þ b4 Leverageit
þ b5 Change ownershipit þ
X
ai þ
X
dt þ mit (1)
All variables are defined as explained. We also include firm (ai) and year (dt)
dummies in the analysis. The residuals from this regression are denoted Gov6
or Gov8, depending on the IndGov# indicator used. These residuals capture the
level of governance orthogonal to firm characteristics and fiscal year. Higher
values of Gov6 or Gov8 are associated to stronger governance structures. We
use Gov6 and Gov8 as our main proxy of the characteristics of the board of direc-
tors. Firms with high (low) values of Gov# are those with low (high) CEO invol-
vement in board decisions, which we refer to as firms with strong (weak)
governance.
3.2. Accounting Conservatism Measure
Accounting conservatism is measured initially using the Basu (1997) model.
Basu’s measure of accounting conservatism is based on the idea that conserva-
tism generates earnings that reflect bad news faster than good news due to the
asymmetric accounting requirements for the verification and recognition of
gains and losses. Basu uses market returns as his proxy for the existence of
good and bad news during the period. Prices incorporate all the information arriv-
ing at the market from many sources beyond accounting data. Thus, changes in
prices during the period (returns) are a good measure of the arrival of news to the
market. Because earnings capture bad news in a timelier fashion than good news,
Basu predicts that there will be a higher association between earnings and returns
when returns are negative (his proxy for bad news), than when returns are posi-
tive (his proxy for good news). The Basu model is as follows:
Xit ¼ b0 þ b1 Dit þ b2 Retit þ b3 Dit Retit þ uit (2)
where it are firm-year indicators, X is earnings per share after extraordinary items
divided by the beginning-of-period price. Ret is the rate of return for the period, D
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there is bad news (when the return
is negative or zero); 0 if there is good news (positive return).7 The b3 coefficient
measures the asymmetric recognition speed of bad news in earnings the level of
conservatism and is expected to be significantly positive.
Some authors have raised concerns about the use of the Basu method to
measure the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. In particular, Dietrich et al.
(2007) show that partitioning a regression sample with one of the regressors
may produce biased inferences. They also argue that inferences from Basu’s
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regression might be biased due to earnings driving returns. For these reasons,
they suggest the use of alternative measures to validate the robustness of infer-
ences drawn with the Basu approach. We do so in Section 5.3 below by using
the Ball and Shivakumar (2005) measure which is entirely accounting-based.
Nevertheless, despite these concerns, Ryan (2006, footnote 2) argues that the
biases introduced by the Basu approach are likely to be small.8 Following
Ryan (2006), to ameliorate these concerns we measure returns over the fiscal
year. This partially removes the impact of the annual earnings announcement
over stock prices, which occurs several months after closing.9
To study the differential conservatism across governance structures we will use
the following adaptation of the Basu model in which we interact our governance
proxy with all the variables in the original model (2):
Xit ¼ b0 þ b1 Dit þ b2 Gov#it þ b3 Dit Gov#it þ b4 Rit þ b5 Retit Gov#it
þ b6 Dit Retit þ b7 Dit Retit Gov#it þ
X
at þ uit (3)
where Gov# is our aggregate corporate governance measure orthogonal to firm
characteristics and
P
at are year dummies. Our prediction is that the coefficient
that measures the interaction between conservatism and governance (b7) will be
significantly positive, consistent with better governed firms showing a higher
level of conditional conservatism. Additionally, we control for differences in
firm growth opportunities as measured by the market-to-book value of equity
ratio (MTB) following the approach of Roychowdhury and Watts (2007). In par-
ticular, we augment equation (3) by interacting the explanatory variables with the
market-to-book ratio as follows:
Xit ¼ b0 þb1 Dit þb2 Gov6it þb3 Dit Gov6it þb01 MTBit þb11 MTBit Dit
þb21 MTBit Gov6it þb31 MTBit Dit Gov6it þb4 Retit þb5 Retit Gov6it
þb41 MTBit Retit þb51 MTBit Retit Gov6it þb6 Dit Retit þb7 Dit Retit Gov6it
þb61 MTBit Dit Rit þb71 MTBit Dit Retit Gov6it þ
X
at þ uit (4)
It is important to control for these growth differences, because changes in growth
opportunities can create variations in the asymmetric timeliness of earnings that
are unrelated to accounting conservatism (Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007).
The aim of our study is not to estimate the level of conservatism of each type
of governance structure, but to determine if there are significant differences in
the level of conservatism across governance structures, once we have controlled
for differences in growth opportunities. The market-to-book ratio also acts as a
proxy of unconditional or balance-sheet conservatism, that is, of the persistent
understatement of net assets derived from the use of historical cost accounting
or the non-recognition of intangible assets. Pope and Walker (2003) and
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Beaver and Ryan (2005) purport that firms that understate their net assets are
likely to be less earnings conservative, as bad news has been anticipated.
Because unconditional conservatism pre-empts conditional conservatism, it is
important to control for the potential understatement of net assets in our tests,
to ensure that comparisons across weak and strong governance structures are
not driven by differences in the use of unconditional conservatism.
4. Sample Selection Procedure
Accounting and market data are downloaded from Bureau Van Dijk Osiris.
Corporate governance data are obtained from SpencerStuart.10 To limit the influ-
ence of extreme observations, we delete the top and bottom percentiles of the
distribution of returns (R) and scaled earnings (X ).11 Following extant research
in this area, we delete financial firms from our sample, as their accounting data
is not comparable to the rest of the sample firms. The intersection of these
databases results in a final sample of 193 firm-year observations corresponding
to 69 separate Spanish firms for the period 1997 2002 with complete data to
run all the tests. Out of the 193 observations, 28 are firms that operate in the
primary sector and construction, 98 operate in the secondary industry (manufac-
turing), 50 are transportation, communication and public service firms, and the
remaining 17 are service and retailing companies. Regarding the annual distri-
bution of the observations, 16 belong to 1997, 16 to 1998, 26 to 1999, 35 to
2000, 53 to 2001 and 47 to 2002.
Table 1 contains sample descriptive statistics. The descriptive statistics show
that, on average, 79% of the directors are non-executives, 36% of all directors
are independent and the board meets 9 times a year. We can also see that 64%
(62%) of the firms have an audit committee (nomination/remuneration commit-
tee), 51% of the firms do not have an executive committee and 82% of the firms
have a board size of 15 or less components, as recommended by the Olivencia
Report. Finally, in 28% of the firms, the CEO is also an executive director.
Consistent with the existence of conditional conservatism, that is, with the
asymmetric timeliness of earnings, earnings are negatively skewed (the
medians are greater than the means). As expected, we also observe that the stan-
dard deviation of returns is greater than the standard deviation of earnings, and
that accruals are on average negative due to the effect of amortization and
depreciation. Table 2 presents the correlation matrix. We observe a very high
correlation between IndGov6 and IndGov8. The two variables we exclude from
IndGov8 to build IndGov6 (the lack of an executive committee and whether
the board is formed by less than 15 members) are not correlated with IndGov6.
This likely confirms our expectation that board size and the existence of an
executive committee are potentially less reliable measures of corporate govern-
ance, as they are not correlated with the remaining well-documented governance
factors that make up IndGov6. This could be interpreted as IndGov6 being a more
reliable measure of governance quality.12
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variable definition Variable Mean St. dev. Perc. 25 Median Perc. 75
Earnings per share X 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.10
Share return Ret 0.01 0.35 0.23 0.04 0.19
Total accruals ACCR 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.04
Cash flows from
operations
CF 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.13
Size (log of market value
of equity)
Size 13.56 1.68 12.18 13.77 14.65
Profitability (earnings/
equity)
Profitability 0.08 0.40 0.06 0.11 0.16
Leverage (debt/assets) Leverage 0.62 0.18 0.51 0.65 0.76
Change in ownership Change ownership 0.09 0.29 0 0 0
Market to book ratio MTB 2.36 2.83 1.05 1.61 2.27
Aggregate Corp. Gov.
Index
IndGov6 0.38 0.27 0.19 0.42 0.57
Aggregate Corp. Gov.
Index
IndGov8 0.37 0.20 0.23 0.36 0.53
Aggregate Corp. Gov.
Index
Gov6 0.00 0.21 0.11 0 0.10
Aggregate Corp. Gov.
Index
Gov8 0.00 0.17 0.09 0 0.08
% non executive directors Propnonexe 0.79 0.13 0.73 0.82 0.88
% independent directors Propindep 0.36 0.23 0.20 0.36 0.50
Chairman is an executive Chairnonexe 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00
Number of board meetings Nmeetings 9.04 3.23 6.00 9.00 12.00
Audit committee
existence
Audicom 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00
Nom./retribution
committee
Retricom 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00
Lack of executive
committee
No Execom 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Board size smaller than 16 Board15orless 0.82 0.38 1.00 1.00 1.00
The sample consists of 193 firm year observations for the period 1997 2002, corresponding to 69
firms. X is earnings per share after extraordinary items divided by beginning of period price. Ret is
annual return. ACCR are total accruals scaled by beginning of period total assets, CF are cash
flows from operations divided by beginning of period total assets. Size equals the natural log of the
market value of equity at fiscal year end. Profitability is measured as net income divided by share
holders’ equity at fiscal year end. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets at fiscal year end.
Change ownership is an indicator variable that equals 1 if there is an annual change in the number
of shares outstanding greater than 10%, and 0 otherwise. MTB is the market to book value of
equity ratio at the end of the year. IndGov6 and IndGov8 are aggregate indexes that measure govern
ance quality. Higher values of the index are associated to stronger governance. Propnonexe is the pro
portion of non executive directors. Propindep is the proportion of independent directors. Chairnonexe
takes the value of 1 if the chairman of the board is not an executive; 0 otherwise. Nmeetings is the
number of board meetings. Audicom takes the value of 1 if the firm has an audit committee; 0 other
wise. Retricom takes the value of 1 if the firm has a nomination/remuneration committee; 0 otherwise.
No Execom takes the value of 0 if there is an executive committee; 1 otherwise. Board15orless takes
the value of 1 if there are less than 16 directors on the board; 0 otherwise.
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Table 2. Correlation matrix
X Ret ACCR CF MTB IndGov6 IndGov8 Propnonexe Propindep Chairnonexe Nmeetings Audicom Retricom No Execom
Ret 0.29
ACCR 0.00 0.07
CF 0.47 0.11 20.58
MTB 20.07 20.07 20.03 0.25
IndGov6 20.02 20.08 20.09 20.05 20.03
IndGov8 20.04 20.09 20.10 0.01 20.00 0.89
Propnonexe 0.10 20.08 20.31 0.13 0.00 0.49 0.40
Propindep 20.01 20.05 0.10 20.14 0.08 0.49 0.49 0.03
Chairnonexe 20.17 20.01 20.12 0.01 20.03 0.36 0.34 0.16 20.13
Nmeetings 0.09 0.04 0.23 20.17 0.05 0.49 0.38 0.23 0.03 0.16
Audicom 20.05 20.07 20.07 20.04 20.10 0.76 0.72 0.19 0.32 0.01 0.18
Retricom 0.00 20.09 20.15 0.06 20.10 0.73 0.64 0.16 0.26 0.03 0.13 0.74
No Execom 20.01 20.05 20.09 0.14 20.03 0.09 0.45 0.01 20.13 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.04
Board15orless 20.09 20.00 20.01 0.05 0.04 20.02 0.34 20.14 0.14 0.05 20.12 0.05 20.05 0.36
The sample consists of 193 firm year observations for the period 1997 2002, corresponding to 69 firms. X is earnings per share after extraordinary items divided by
beginning of period price. Ret is annual return. ACCR are total accruals divided by total assets in t2 1. CF is cash flows from operations divided by total assets in
t2 1. MTB is the market to book equity ratio at the end of the year. IndGov6 and IndGov8 are aggregate indexes that measure governance quality. Higher values of
the index are associated to stronger governance. Propnonexe is the proportion of non executive directors. Propindep is the proportion of independent directors.
Chairnonexe takes the value of 1 if the chairman of the board is not an executive; 0 otherwise. Nmeetings is the number of board meetings. Audicom takes the
value of 1 if the firm has an audit 0 otherwise. Retricom takes the value of 1 if the firm has a nomination/remuneration committee; 0 otherwise. No Ex
ecom takes the value of 0 if there is an executive committee; 1 otherwise. Board15orless takes the value of 1 if there are less than 16 directors on the board; 0
otherwise.
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5. Empirical Results
5.1. Differences in Conservatism across Governance Structures
For parsimony, in what follows we only report and discuss the results obtained
using the governance index Gov6, as all the inferences hold when we use the
alternative index Gov8.13
Table 3 shows the results of running equation (1) with IndGov6 as the depen-
dent variable. We use the residuals (Gov6) of equation (1) as our main measure of
governance quality (a governance proxy that is orthogonal to firm character-
istics). Because governance is to a certain extent endogenously determined,
controlling for firm characteristics has become usual practice when analysing
the relation between governance and accounting numbers (see Bushman et al.,
2004; Garcı´a Lara et al., 2009, among others). The explanatory power of
regression (1) is high (adjusted R 2 74%) and the signs of the coefficients are
consistent with expectations: governance provisions are stronger for larger and
more levered firms, and weaker for growing and highly profitable firms. We
find similar results when using IndGov8 as the dependent variable.14
To analyse the difference in conservatism across governance structures we
estimate equation (3). Table 4 shows the results of this estimation using Gov6
as our aggregate corporate governance index. Consistent with prior research on
asymmetric timeliness of earnings in European countries, the good news
Table 3. Regression on economic determinants of governance
IndGov6it ¼ b0þ b1 Sizeitþ b2 MTBitþ b3 Profitabilityitþb4 Leverageit
þ b5 Change ownershipit þ Saiþ Sdtþ mit
Coeff. t Stat.
Intercept b0 3.89 2.59
Size b1 0.23 2.09
Market to book b2 0.05 1.14
Profitability b3 0.06 0.42
Leverage b4 0.79 1.69
Change ownership b5 0.03 0.33
Firm dummies Yes
Year dummies Yes
Adjusted R 2 0.74
F Value (Prob . F ) 5.55 (0.00)
No. observations 193
The sample consists of 193 firm year observations for the period 1997 2002, corresponding to 69
firms. IndGov6 is an aggregate index that measures governance quality. Size is the natural logarithm
of market value. Market to book is the ratio of market capitalization divided by shareholders’ equity.
Profitability is earnings divided by shareholders’ equity at fiscal year end. Leverage is total debt
divided by total assets at fiscal year end. Change ownership is a dummy variable taking the value
of 1 if there is an annual change greater than 10% in the number of shares outstanding, and 0 other
wise. Sai and Sdt stand for firm specific and year specific dummy variables, respectively. Regression
results for these variables are omitted for parsimony.
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coefficient (b4) is positive, and significant in a one-sided test ( p-value , 0.08).
The sign of the differential good news recognition speed in good governed
firms (b5) is, as expected, negative (albeit insignificant). A negative sign is con-
sistent with good governed firms not recognizing good news faster than weak
governance firms. Consistent with the existence of conservatism in all firms,
the b6 coefficient, which captures the additional recognition speed of bad news
with respect to good news, is significantly positive. Finally, the significantly posi-
tive b7 coefficient captures our main result: good governed firms (firms with
stronger boards) show more conditionally conservative accounting numbers.15
This result is robust to several different specifications: (a) excluding regulated
firms from the analysis (SIC code 49, losing 32 firm-year observations); (b) split-
ting the sample between strong and weak governed firms using Gov6, Gov8,
IndGov6 or IndGov8; (c) excluding from the sample firms that are cross-listed,
Table 4. Measuring accounting conservatism: corporate governance effects controlling for
firm economic characteristics. Comparison of the level of accounting conservatism across
governance structures:
Xit ¼ b0þ b1 Ditþ b2 Gov6itþ b3 Dit Gov6itþ b4 Retitþ b5 Retit Gov6it
þ b6 Dit Retitþ b7 Dit Retit Gov6itþ Satþ uit
Intercept b0 0.05
t stat 2.04
D b1 0.04
t stat 1.90
Gov6 b2 0.04
t stat 0.51
D Gov6 b3 0.07
t stat 0.77
Ret b4 0.07
t stat 1.43
Ret Gov6 b5 0.10
t stat 0.77
D Ret b6 0.15
t stat 1.89
D Ret Gov6 b7 0.59
t stat 2.17
Adj R 2 0.11
F Value (Prob . F ) 5.05 (0.00)
No. observations 193
The sample consists of 193 firm year observations for the period 1997 2002, corresponding to 69
firms. Gov6 is an aggregate measure of corporate governance quality: the residuals from a regression
of IndGov6 on a set of variables that measure firm characteristics: (i) size, (ii) market to book ratio,
(iii) profitability, (iv) leverage, (v) changes in ownership, and firm and year dummies. The residuals
from these regressions are denoted Gov6, and they reflect governance quality orthogonal to these firm
characteristics. Higher values of the index are associated to stronger governance. X is earnings per
share scaled by beginning of period price, Ret is annual return, D is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 0 if Ret is positive; 1 otherwise. Sat represent year dummies (not reported for parsimony).
Reported t statistics are calculated using the Huber White variance covariance matrix, and are
robust to the presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation (Rogers, 1993).
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as they may have different incentives to be conditionally conservative; and (d)
excluding from the sample the observations from 1997 and 1998 to avoid the
confounding effects of the regulatory changes introduced by the Olivencia
Report. The difference in the conservatism coefficient across strong and weak
governance firms is always significant and greater for strong governance firms;
(e) replicating equation (3) not including year dummies; and (f) replicating
equation (3) using Gov8 or IndGov8 as governance indexes. The year dummies
are insignificant across all specifications. These results are obtained pooling
all data together. Table 5 presents the results of estimating equation (3)
using Fama and MacBeth (1973) mean annual regressions. The use of the
Fama MacBeth approach has become standard in the accounting literature to
Table 5. Measuring accounting conservatism: corporate governance effects controlling for
firm economic characteristics. Fama MacBeth (1973) regressions. Comparison of the
level of accounting conservatism across governance structures:
Xit ¼ b0þ b1 Ditþ b2 Gov6itþ b3 Dit Gov6itþ b4 Retitþ b5 Retit Gov6it
þ b6 Dit Retitþ b7 Dit Retit Gov6itþ Satþ uit
Intercept b0 0.05
t stat 6.99
D b1 0.05
t stat 1.52
Gov6 b2 0.15
t stat 1.44
D Gov6 b3 0.02
t stat 0.14
Ret b4 0.09
t stat 1.96
Ret Gov6 b5 0.33
t stat 1.90
D Ret b6 0.22
t stat 1.29
D Ret Gov6 b7 1.20
t stat 2.42
Adj R 2 0.14
No. observations 193
The sample consists of 193 firm year observations for the period 1997 2002, corresponding to 69
firms. Gov6 is an aggregate measure of corporate governance quality: the residuals from a regression
of IndGov6 on a set of variables that measure firm characteristics: (i) size, (ii) market to book ratio,
(iii) profitability, (iv) leverage, (v) changes in ownership, and firm and year dummies. The residuals
from these regressions are denoted Gov6, and they reflect governance quality orthogonal to these firm
characteristics. Higher values of the index are associated to stronger governance. X is earnings per
share scaled by beginning of period price, Ret is annual return, D is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 0 if Ret is positive; 1 otherwise. Sat represents year dummies (not reported for parsi
mony). We use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology to cope with the possible cross sectional
dependence problems. The coefficients of the parameters have been obtained as the simple average
from annual cross section regressions. The t statistics are the ratios of the mean estimated coefficients
to the standard deviation of the distribution of the annual estimated slope coefficients, divided by the
square root of the number of years.
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cope with cross-sectional dependence problems. Although its use with reduced
samples, such as our case, might not yield robust estimates because of the
reduced number of observations per annual regression, our results using the
Fama MacBeth approach confirm those of the pooled analysis: firms with stron-
ger boards are more conditionally conservative, as captured by a positive and sig-
nificant b7 coefficient.
5.2. Influence of Growth Opportunities on the Level of Conservatism
Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) show the importance of controlling for
differences in growth opportunities when measuring conservatism. Changes
in growth opportunities can affect accounting conservatism estimates and
introduce differences that are not related to the asymmetric incorporation of
news into earnings. To ensure that our results are not driven by differences
in growth opportunities across governance structures, we augment equation
(3) by interacting the explanatory variables with the market-to-book ratio
(similarly to Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007) yielding equation (4). We use
the market-to-book ratio (MTB) as a proxy of growth opportunities. This
ratio acts as well as a proxy of the level of unconditional conservatism, that
is, of the understatement of net assets.
Table 6 shows the results of this test. For brevity, we only reproduce the coef-
ficients of interest in the table. Our previous inferences do not change after con-
trolling for the market-to-book ratio: stronger governance structures (firms with
stronger boards) show more conditionally conservative accounting numbers
(positive and significant b7). In addition, we also find negative b61 and b71 coef-
ficients. We expect these coefficients to be negative because: (1) it is reasonable
to assume that firms with high growth opportunities may need less stringent gov-
ernance structures, or may have insider-dominated boards, since external direc-
tors with experience in managing growth opportunities are relatively scarce
(Booth and Deli, 1996) and it is likely that independent directors will have less
knowledge of the firm and its industry, making their presence less desirable in
this type of firm (Bhagat and Black, 1999); and (2) it could be argued that
firms showing high market-to-book ratios are also firms with high levels of
unconditional conservatism. Unconditional conservatism pre-empts conditional
conservatism reducing the empirical measures of asymmetric earnings timeliness
(Pope and Walker, 2003; Beaver and Ryan, 2005).
5.3. Sensitivity Check: Accruals-Based Measure of Accounting Conservatism
A measure of conservatism that overcomes most of the limitations of the Basu
approach (see Dietrich et al., 2007) is the one developed by Ball and Shivakumar
(2005). These authors measure conservatism for a sample of private UK firms.
Because prices are not available for private firms, they cannot use the Basu
(1997) measure in their tests, and they develop an alternative measure of
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conditional conservatism based on the links between total accruals and operating
cash flows. The intuition is the same as in the Basu model: accounting earnings
tend to anticipate the recognition of bad news and to delay the recognition of
good news. Total accruals and cash flows are negatively associated, as has
been documented by previous research (e.g. Dechow, 1994); but this negative
association, because of the asymmetric recognition of news in earnings, tends
to be lower in periods with economic losses. Total accruals recognize the
impact of negative economic events in the period they take place; these
adverse effects tend to affect cash flows as well, lowering the negative correlation
between cash flows and accruals. Ball and Shivakumar use the following
Table 6. Measuring accounting conservatism: differences in governance structures and
growth opportunities
Xit ¼ b0þ b1 Ditþ b2 Gov6itþ b3 Dit Gov6itþ b01 MTBitþ b11 MTBit Ditþ b21 MTBit
Gov6itþ b31 MTBit Dit Gov6itþ b4 Retitþ b5 Retit Gov6itþ b41 MTBit Retitþ b51
MTBit Retit Gov6itþ b6 Dit Retitþ b7 Dit Retit Gov6itþ b61 MTBit Dit Retitþ b71 MTBit
Dit Retit Gov6itþ Satþ uit
R b4 0.08
t stat 0.80
Ret Gov6 b5 0.44
t stat 0.90
MTB Ret b41 0.01
t stat 0.36
MTB Ret Gov6 b51 0.14
t stat 0.83
D Ret b6 0.23
t stat 1.71
D Ret Gov6 b7 1.70
t stat 2.33
MTB D Ret b61 0.04
t stat 1.08
MTB D Ret Gov6 b71 0.45
t stat 1.98
Adj R 2 0.15
F Value (Prob . F ) 3.81 (0.00)
No. observations 193
The sample consists of 193 firm year observations for the period 1997 2002, corresponding to 69
firms. Gov6 is an aggregate measure of corporate governance quality: the residuals from a regression
of IndGov6 on a set of variables that measure firm characteristics: (i) size, (ii) market to book ratio,
(iii) profitability, (iv) leverage, (v) changes in ownership, and firm and year dummies. The residuals
from these regressions are denoted Gov6, and they reflect governance quality orthogonal to these firm
characteristics. Higher values of the index are associated to stronger governance. X is earnings per
share scaled by beginning of period price, Ret is annual return, D is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 0 if Ret is positive; 1 otherwise. MTB is the ratio of market capitalization to shareholders’
equity. Sat represent year dummies (not reported for parsimony). Reported t statistics are calculated
using the Huber White variance covariance matrix, and are robust to the presence of heteroscedas
ticity and serial correlation (Rogers, 1993). We do not report the intercept and its interactions with the
bad news dummy, the governance index and the MTB ratio for parsimony. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21
regression to measure this association between cash flows and accruals:
ACCRit ¼ b0 þ b1 DCFit þ b2 CFit þ b3 DCFit CFit þ mit (5)
where ACCR are total accruals scaled by beginning-of-period total assets, CF are
operating cash flows scaled by beginning-of-period total assets, DCF is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if firm CF is at the lower 5% of the distribution;
0 otherwise. This dummy variable captures the occasions when bad news
(economic losses) has occurred during the period, lowering cash flows, that is,
it captures situations when cash flows are negative or very low.16 In equation
(5), b2 is expected to be significantly negative, reflecting the negative association
between cash flows and accruals, whilst b3 is expected to be positive, indicating
that economic losses are reflected both in cash flows and accruals at the same
time. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) provide evidence consistent with their predic-
tions, documenting that b2 (b3) is negative (positive).
To analyse the differences in conservatism across governance structures, we
augment equation (5), interacting all explanatory variables with Gov6 in the
following fashion:
ACCRit ¼b0þb1 DCFitþb2 Gov6itþb3 DCFit Gov6itþb4 CFtþb5 CFit Gov6it
þb6 DCFit CFitþb7 DCFit CFit Gov6itþ
X
atþuit (6)
where
P
at represent year indicator variables. Table 7 shows the results from
estimating equation (6) using Gov6 as the aggregate governance measure. The
results confirm that strong governance firms are clearly more conservative than
weak governance firms: b7 is significantly positive. If we repeat this test using
Gov8, IndGov6 or IndGov8 as governance measures, our inferences do not
change.
6. Conclusions
We analyse the association between conditional conservatism and board of direc-
tors’ characteristics. Accounting conservatism produces earnings that reflect bad
news faster than good news. Specifically, we analyse whether firms with low
CEO influence on board decision making (strong governance structures) are
more accounting conservative than firms where the CEO has a high influence
on board decision making (weak governance structures). To measure conditional
conservatism we use the Basu (1997) and the Ball and Shivakumar (2005)
approaches. Both are based on the asymmetric incorporation of news to account-
ing earnings, that is, on the differential recognition speed of bad news into
earnings relative to good news.
The quality of corporate governance is assessed using two aggregate measures
that incorporate several characteristics of the board of directors and its monitoring
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committees. These measures include the proportion of non-executive directors,
the proportion of independent directors, whether the chairman of the board is
an executive director, the number of annual board meetings, the existence of an
audit committee, the existence of a remuneration/nomination committee, the
non-existence of an executive committee and the size of the board. We acknowl-
edge that our measurement is a simplification of the complex construct embodied
by corporate governance. Our study focuses on one of its dimensions: certain
characteristics of the board of directors. Therefore, our results should be inter-
preted under this perspective, although, as pointed out below, this does not
seem to be a major shortcoming. When building our governance measures we
explicitly control for firms’ characteristics and contracting environment, so that
they are orthogonal to size, growth, profitability, leverage and changes in
Table 7. Measuring accounting conservatism: corporate governance effects controlling for
firm economic characteristics. Accruals based analysis. Comparison of the level of
accounting conservatism across governance structures:
ACCRit ¼ b0þ b1 DCFitþ b2 Gov6itþ b3 DCFit Gov6itþ b4 CFtþ b5 CFit Gov6it
þ b6 DCFit CFitþ b7 DCFit CFit Gov6itþ Satþ uit
Intercept b0 0.02
t stat 2.68
DCF b1 0.00
t stat 0.35
Gov6 b2 0.00
t stat 0.13
DCF Gov6 b3 0.14
t stat 4.18
CF b4 0.29
t stat 6.52
CF Gov6 b5 0.04
t stat 0.19
DCF CF b6 0.59
t stat 4.22
DCF CF Gov6 b7 3.46
t stat 5.25
Adj R 2 0.37
F Value (Prob . F ) 8.61 (0.00)
No. observations 193
The sample consists of 193 firm year observations for the period 1997 2002, corresponding to 69
firms. Gov6 is an aggregate measure of corporate governance quality: the residuals from a regression
of IndGov6 on a set of variables that measure firm characteristics: (i) size, (ii) market to book ratio,
(iii) profitability, (iv) leverage, (v) changes in ownership, and firm and year dummies. The residuals
from these regressions are denoted Gov6, and they reflect governance quality orthogonal to these firm
characteristics. Higher values of the index are associated to stronger governance. ACCR are total
accruals scaled by beginning of period total assets, CF are cash flows from operations divided by
beginning of period total assets, DCF is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firm CF are
at the lower 5% of the distribution; 0 otherwise. Sat represent year dummies (not reported for parsi
mony). Reported t statistics are calculated using the Huber White variance covariance matrix, and
are robust to the presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation (Rogers, 1993).
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ownership. Controlling for firm characteristics allow us to identify firms that
depart from the type of governance that could be considered standard given
their characteristics.
Using a sample of Spanish firms for the period 1997 2002, our results indicate
that the asymmetric incorporation of news into earnings, and more specifically,
the incorporation of bad news into earnings is significantly faster (timelier) in
firms with stronger boards. Thus, our evidence is consistent with strong boards
using conditional conservatism as a governance mechanism to a greater extent
than firms with weaker boards. Furthermore, we show that accounting earnings
in firms with weaker boards capture good news faster than the earnings of
firms with stronger boards. Put together, these results suggest that weak govern-
ance firms report less reliable accounting information than strong governance
firms. This result is robust to controlling for differences in the market-to-book
ratio, a proxy for differences in growth opportunities and for unconditional con-
servatism. Differences in the market-to-book ratio could affect the measures of
conservatism, so it is important to ensure that the observed differences in conser-
vatism across governance structures are not driven by other factors. Additionally,
we also control for firm characteristics that may affect governance choice.
Our findings are consistent with the evidence reported by Beekes et al. (2004)
for a UK sample, and Lobo and Zhou (2006), Ahmed and Duellmann (2007) and
Garcı´a Lara et al. (2009) for US samples. These pieces of research use different
measures of corporate governance and confirm that accounting conservatism
plays an important role in governance. Our results add confidence to the robust-
ness of the association between corporate governance and accounting conserva-
tism, as this relation is shown to exist in a civil-law regime where the demand for
conditionally conservative accounting numbers is more reduced given the low
impact of litigation risk and the high demand (from financial institutions) for
unconditionally (balance-sheet) conservative accounting numbers.
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Notes
1We use the terms interchangeably throughout the paper.
2Non executive directors include independent directors and directors representing institutional
investors.
3Put together, these corporate governance measures determine the power of the CEO. The lower
the monitoring exerted by these governance mechanisms, the higher the power of the CEO and
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his ability to entrench himself and expropriate firm resources, by for example, demanding
golden parachutes in his contract, or executing a poison pill when facing a takeover threat.
4Previous work on audit committee efficiency indicates that the presence of independent direc
tors enhances the performance of the audit committee. However, data on audit committee com
position are not available.
5Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), we use unit weights to create IndGov6 and
IndGov8; this is in accordance with the recommendations of Grice and Harris (1998), who
show that aggregate measures built using unit weights have better psychometric properties.
6Therefore, both indexes are based on internal corporate governance mechanisms, basically
related to the power or influence of the CEO over the board. Corporate governance incorporates
all the measures and instruments that guarantee investors a return for their investment (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997) and, therefore, a broader set of mechanisms, both internal and external (see,
e.g. Gompers et al., 2003). See Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Tirole (2001) and Becht et al.
(2003) for more detailed reviews of corporate governance mechanisms.
7Accounting earnings are composed of cash flows plus total accruals. Generally, it is assumed
that the asymmetric recognition of bad news in earnings is attained via total accruals. Hence,
the faster total accruals reflect bad news about the firm, the more conservative earnings will be.
8Ryan (2006, footnote 2) states that ‘two well known empirical results together imply the biases
identified by Dietrich et al. are likely to be fairly small and so biases in returns based measures
of asymmetric timeliness are likely to be correspondingly small. First, the low R2s observed in
contemporaneous returns earnings regressions suggest that the extent to which earnings
causes returns is tiny compared to the extent to which both variables are determined by
other, more primitive information. Second, a large literature, only some of which employs
the reverse regressions of earnings on returns used to estimate asymmetric timeliness, exists
that shows returns typically reflect information on a timelier basis than earnings.’
9Ryan (2006) also suggests the approach of Shroff et al. (2004) who examine only large return
changes in windows other than earnings announcements. In our case, due to the small number of
observations this method is unfeasible.
10From 1997 onwards, SpencerStuart publishes an annual report entitled ‘I´ndice Spencer Stuart
de Consejos de Administracio´n’, that contains the information used in our study.
11We also winsorize one remaining extreme value for the market to book ratio. This does not
change the inferences.
12Given the high correlation between the existence of an audit committee and a nomination com
mittee, in an additional sensitivity check, we delete from the aggregate indexes the nomination
committee variable. Our results are not affected if we delete or include this variable.
13All these results are available from the authors upon request.
14If we do not include firm or year dummies in equation (1), the market to book ratio and profit
ability coefficients become significant.
15As an additional test, we analyse if discretionary accruals are used by managers in strong gov
ernance firms to make earnings timelier to bad news. We rerun models (2) and (3) using as
dependent variable a measure of discretionary accruals and of non discretionary earnings.
However, our results are not conclusive. We do not find significant differences in the level of
discretionary accruals across strong and weak governance firms. Plus, parametric and non
parametric tests of differences of means and medians show that the differences in discretionary
accruals across governance structures are not statistically significant. Thus, we cannot conclude
that the observed differences in the use of conditional conservatism between strong and weak
governance firms are driven by the use of discretionary accruals. Hence, although there
might be differences in the use of discretionary accruals across weak and strong governance
firms (Garcı´a Lara et al., 2009; Garcı´a Osma and Gill de Albornoz, 2007) to induce more con
ditional conservatism, the low power of our test does not allow us to detect these differences.
16Ball and Shivakumar (2005) define DCF ¼ 1 if CF is negative. In our sample only seven obser
vations present negative cash flows (3.6% of the full sample), this is why we change the
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criterion to define bad news with respect to cash flows. We set bad news as CF that is at the
lower 5% of the distribution. Our inferences do not change if we set the threshold at other
levels from 3.6% to 25%.
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